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Over the years, historians of medicine with Ph.Ds in History have 
understood the history of medicine largely as an exercise in intellectual or 
cultural history. But for historians of psychiatry, another orientation is 
possible: using the vast record of psychiatry's past as a creek in gold country 
to be sifted until precious nuggets are found that may be of relevance to the 
care of patients and the advancement of science today. This is presentism 
with a vengeance, approaching the past not to justify the present, but to aid 
it. Yet clinical medicine is all about helping patients and furthering science. 
Why should the history of medicine not also be about correcting current 
concepts of diagnosis and therapy by recurring to the wisdom of past times? 
Much was done in the past in psychiatry that was unwise, such as 
ovariectomies for hysteria or the treatment of chronic psychosis with 
lobotomy. Yet in many ways psychiatry today is the poorer for having 
largely lost contact with its own past, because many of the diagnoses of yore 
(and some of the treatments) cut nature more closely to the joints than do 
diagnosis and treatment today.1 
 
 
Why psychiatric historians have shied away from the study of disease 
 
Previous historians have taken diagnosis largely as an exercise in intellectual 
history. They have studied the filiation of ideas as the diagnoses were 
handed down over the years.2 They have mocked ironically diagnoses that 
are somehow out of step with contemporary culture.3 They have tried to 
understand the social sources – as opposed to the biological urgings – that 
gave rise to some diagnoses, such as hysteria.4 With the exception of the 
                                                     
1 For background see: C.M. Swartz and E. Shorter, Psychotic Depression (New York 
2007); E. Shorter, Before Prozac: The Troubled History of Mood Disorders in Psychiatry 
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4 E. Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830-1980 





great work of German Berrios, a psychiatrist, on the history of mental 
symptoms5, most historians of psychiatry never really get much beyond 
hysteria. Mood disorders, psychosis, delirious mania: much of the rest of the 
field has been left fallow. 
In this volume Matthew Smith reconstructs the ‘ontology’ of 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), focusing on the finances 
of psychiatrists, the profits of pharmaceutical companies, and the 
pathologisation of ADHD itself. While it is true that the diagnosis has 
become vastly overblown beyond its natural limits, in some children nature 
does take a hand: ADHD may correspond to an organic brain condition 
that is not a product of social construction; this is among the earliest 
findings in the study of hyperactivity. Many such children have an abnormal 
electroencephalographic (EEG) examination and such EEG findings date 
from 1938; one would expect historians of ADHD to be aware of this.6  
But what if the diagnoses are real, as opposed to being social labels? 
What if they correspond to what people actually had? What if the diagnoses 
of the past in fact represent real disease entities? If the diagnoses change, 
then either the diseases themselves have changed – witness the debate over 
the apparent increase in the frequency of schizophrenia7 – or the worldview 
of the diagnosticians themselves has changed. It was not because of 
advances in diagnostic science that the diagnosis ‘neurasthenia’ was replaced 
with ‘depressive neurosis’. It was because psychoanalysis, as a social and 
cultural movement, eclipsed biological thinking in psychiatry in the 1920s.8 
In other words, society won out over biology.  
In this volume Jaap Bos, of the University of Utrecht, examines the 
decline of psychoanalysis, asking whether it has been marginalized because 
science overtook it, or because of a ‘self-marginalizing discourse that made 
itself superfluous’. 
In my essay, the question is: Why have historians of psychiatry 
tended to shy away from histories of psychiatric disease? 
                                                     
5  G.E. Berrios, The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology Since the 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge 1996). 
6  H.H. Jasper et al., ‘Electroencephalographic Analyses of Behavior Problem 
Children’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 95 (1938) 641-658. 
7 On this debate see: E. Shorter, A History of Psychiatry (New York 1997) 62-63. 
8 For background, see: S. Wessely, ‘Old wine in new bottles: neurasthenia and ‘ME’’, 
Psychological Medicine, 20 (1990) 35-53. 




One big reason is that psychiatric historians were infected about 
thirty years ago with a highly virulent strain of the antipsychiatry virus. 
Many writers are reflexly sympathetic to the patients and hostile to the 
physicians. The general stance seems to be that if you had those problems, 
you’d be depressed too. In a sense, the field has never gotten over Michel 
Foucault. Antipsychiatric themes dominated the numerous histories of 
asylums that were churned out then.9 Knowing references to ‘schizophrenia’ 
peppered the texts. There was a collective sense of disbelief that inhabited 
the field: These patients aren’t suffering from disease, they’re suffering from 
labeling!10 (These antimedical attitudes were not confined to historians of 
psychiatry. I remember arriving at a meeting in those years on the history of 
childbirth. I had with me a bag of old-fashioned obstetrical instruments, and 
I recall the gasps of horror as the audience realized that I wanted to talk 
about the history of the actual conduct of childbirth rather than the 
oppression of women.) Thus, given the skepticism about the reality of 
psychiatric disease, given the tardive echoes of the 1960s in the field, and 
the attachment to ideas that portray psychiatrists as agents of capitalism 
rather than as healers, it is unsurprising that few historians chose to research 
the history of the diagnosis and treatment of actual illnesses. (Historian 
Markus Schär’s work Seelennöte der Untertanen on the history of melancholic 
depression in Zurich is a brilliant exception to this11). 
Secondly, writing the history of disease, either within psychiatry or 
any other medical specialty, requires some technical knowledge. Historians 
unable to differentiate catatonia from mania may feel somewhat cast adrift 
when confronted by case records or the literature of the day. Someone 
doesn’t need to be a clinician to make basin-level assessments (getting the 
patient into the correct general illness basin); after a period of study of 
clinical psychiatry, the main points should swim readily into view. However 
it is helpful, in writing the history of disease, to have some knowledge of 
psychopathology. I cannot think of a single PhD historian who has attended 
psychiatry rotations, observed in a clinic, or accompanied staff on hospital 
rounds – in order to get a hands-on sense of what disease feels like in 
psychiatry. I did all of these things, and I was regarded as a bit of an odd-
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ball by my colleagues. So not all historians of medicine go in for this kind of 
hands-on training. But it is very useful in writing the history of disease, 
whether in nephrology or psychiatry. 
Finally, many historians have a residual attachment to seeing the 
history of medicine as the study of ideas. What interests them is how ideas 
about disease have changed over the years, and the interaction between 
society and medicine – how women were supposed to be hysterical, et 
cetera. In psychiatry there is no better illustration of how social ideas 
influence treatment than the stigmatization of electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT) that took place during the 1960s and 1970s. So strong was the stigma 
that the practice of ECT – psychiatry’s most powerful treatment – was 
almost abandoned.12 
To be sure, much of medicine can be understood as a study in the 
filiation of ideas: in psychiatry how the depression diagnosis replaced 
hysteria is an example; this happened not because of new data but because 
ideas about both hysteria and depression changed. Hysteria was thrown out 
as a diagnosis in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, and depression shifted from 
melancholia to a kind of featureless dysphoria called ‘major depression’, as 
common as the common cold. 
 
 
Physicians versus historians in writing the history of psychiatry 
 
Psychiatric history is genuinely interdisciplinary, in that it probably takes 
training as a historian to recognize the primacy of primary sources and to 
put medical events in some kind of cultural context. If the subject is the 
history of diagnosis and treatment in psychiatry, as opposed to ‘psychiatry 
and culture’, some kind of medical training is an advantage because these 
subjects can be quite technical. I am not arguing that historians should stay 
away from writing about diagnosis and treatment, for these are matters that 
may be studied and assimilated, just as historians of mathematics are not 
themselves required to be mathematicians. I am also not suggesting that 
physician-historians shy from the hot iron of ‘culture’, even though their 
training has not equipped them to confront some of the complexities of 
society. Rather, I am arguing that some ‘hands-on’ knowledge of medicine 
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will permit historians to come to grips with the central issues of clinical 
science, namely the history of diagnosis and treatment. 
 
 
The historian as clinical scientist 
 
This brings us to psychiatric history as clinical science. Both historians and 
physicians are theoretically capable of contributing to clinical medicine 
today, yet only physicians seem keen on doing so. Let us contrast the best 
efforts by psychiatrists to write their own history with efforts by historians 
to write psychiatrists’ history for them. Which up to now has been clinically 
more useful? 
Werner Janzarik, professor of Psychiatry in Heidelberg in the 1970s 
and 1980s, was a deeply learned individual intent upon carrying on the 
Heidelberg tradition of the study of psychopathology. Eric Engstrom, a 
historian by trade and currently teaching medical history in Berlin, is not 
less learned, but in letters not in science. Yet a comparison of their work 
leaves the reader uncertain if they are describing the same discipline. 
Janzarik, who appears not to have had a great grasp of cultural history, is 
obliged to move at the technical level of diagnosis, yet does so with an 
expertise that subsequent generations of clinicians will find illuminating; 
Engstrom, who seems to care little for the clinical practice of psychiatry, 
ends up placing psychiatry in an especially unfavorable social light that will 
strike many as antipsychiatric in content – certainly as antipsychiatric for its 
querulousness of tone. 
In 1978 Janzarik led a team of physician-historians commemorating 
the centennial of the founding of the Heidelberg University Psychiatric 
Hospital. Heidelberg, under Emil Kraepelin and his followers Franz Nissl 
and Karl Wilmanns, became the premier world centre for the study of 
psychopathology, and the essays in Janzarik’s volume ventilate this theme in 
various ways. Janzarik’s own contribution, for example, reviews the 
psychiatric literature of the 1870s, and in this light examines the case 
histories of a hundred patients admitted to that Klinik in 1878-1879.13 We 
are in the presence of a commanding figure in understanding the intricacies 
of psychiatric diagnosis in past times.  
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In 2003 Engstrom published a no less commanding work on the 
history of psychiatry in Imperial Germany, touching at length on such 
technical issues as the importance of clinical course, yet reserving his major 
firepower for the relationship between psychiatry and society, Engstrom 
writes:  
 
This assessment of the vicissitudes of German society emphasizes 
that the construction of university clinics as urban asylums needs to 
be seen as representing part of a larger socio-political commitment 
and claim on the part of academic psychiatrists to do battle with 
madness and other ‘diseases of civilization’ in an urban setting. 
 
Engstrom continues with the point that academic psychiatry was the 
‘psychiatric side of Virchow’s medical reforms.’ Urban asylums, he says, 
‘were the flagships of a new scientifically based, social psychiatry’.14 This 
strikes me as completely correct and of great use in coming to grips with the 
larger history of the discipline. 
As stated, the viewpoint that Engstrom takes in the book is militantly 
antipsychiatric. I should be surprised if practicing psychiatrists found much 
there of clinical relevance, though Engstrom certainly offers lessons to be 
learned. By contrast, the essays in the Janzarik volume are full of reflection 
about such diagnoses as ‘paranoia’ and ‘catatonia’; pondering these 
deliberations might have been of great use to the drafters of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, 
currently in its fifth edition.15 Dr Janzarik was indubitably a clinical scientist. 
Yet I am confident that few members of the DSM Task Force had ever 
heard of him, and that fewer still had read his book, written as it was in 
German. The efforts of a psychiatrist-historian probably had little impact, at 
least on the hegemonic American scene. As for Dr Engstrom’s work, I have 
not discussed this personally with him, yet I find it unlikely that he might 
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Other historians have pursued the double role of functioning 
simultaneously as humanist and clinical scientist. The first PhD historian 
explicitly to step into these clinical shoes was Howard Kushner at Emory 
University; it would be fair to say that Kushner has ‘pioneered’ it. Kushner 
has broken new clinical ground in the study of two diseases: Tourette 
Syndrome, a motor disorder resembling catatonia, and Kawasaki Syndrome 
(KS), an autoimmune disorder involving inflammation of blood vessels 
throughout the body. In Kushner’s Tourette’s project, historical sources 
confirmed that some cases resulted from exacerbations following infection 
by rheumatic streptococcus, based on the model of Sydenham’s chorea.16 
The Kawasaki Syndrome team at the University of California at San Diego 
and Emory University used history to revise the then-current diagnostic 
criteria of KS, alerting clinicians to be sensitive to atypical presentations.17 
Kushner observes:  
 
Both of these investigations illustrate how historical interrogations of 
syndrome construction can elicit useful issues for the development 
of research hypotheses and novel approaches to medical 
conundrums.18  
 
Kushner was the first trained PhD historian, of whom I am aware, to lay 
out a historian’s agenda for contributing to clinical medicine.19 
In my own work, I have tried to contribute to clinical science in 
several ways. Family history led me to curiosity about women and the 
history of their health care, given that women’s ill-health20 – in the form, for 
example, of infected abortion – has played such a capital role in their lives 
historically. This greatly interested me in the history of medicine, but I soon 
became aware that I knew nothing about medicine or the basic medical 
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sciences, and that it was impossible to read the scientific literature without 
some kind of medical or scientific background. 
I therefore went to medical school and by 1982 had completed the 
basic science courses of a rigorous medical program. With such subjects as 
Anatomy, Histology, and Pathology under my belt I now had the same basic 
science preparation as a clinician. I did not continue in medical school, but 
in order to gain some exposure to clinical realities, I observed at clinical 
rounds and Grand Rounds in departments of psychiatry and neurology in 
various of Toronto’s teaching hospitals. (The highpoint of my ‘medical’ 
career was being able to diagnose a patient with Progressive Supranuclear 
Palsy (PSP), an obscure but deadly neurological affliction, before the 
diagnosis occurred to any of the clinicians in the room). With this 
background, I returned to research in the history of medicine. 
One area in which I have tried to contribute to clinical science is 
understanding what was once called psychosomatic illness, currently 
‘somatoform disorders’ and ‘somatization’, basically, breakdowns in the 
mind-body relationship. My 1992 book From Paralysis to Fatigue introduced 
the concept of a ‘symptom pool’ from which patients are able 
subconsciously to select the symptoms they wish to present, as supposedly 
‘organic’, to their medical consultants. Items selected from the pool have 
changed over the years.21 Yet some items present in the symptom pools of 
other cultures, such as koro (the delusional belief that one’s penis is 
shrinking and is about to retreat inside one’s abdomen, leading to death), is 
not found in the western symptom pool. 22  Nor are such symptoms of 
voluntary self-starvation as anorexia nervosa, amply abundant in the 
western symptom-pool since the late nineteenth century, found in many 
non-western cultures.23 It would be tedious to trace the impact on medicine 
and psychiatry of this concept of the symptom pool.  
I have collaborated with clinicians in the study of pediatric autism 
and intellectual disability. Lee Wachtel, director of the Neurobehavioral 
Unit at the Kennedy Krieger Institute in Baltimore and associate professor 
of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, made several 
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Distribution of Mental Illness (Berlin 1982) 273-276. 
23 E. Shorter, From the Mind into the Body: The Cultural Origins of Psychosomatic Symptoms 
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fundamental discoveries in this area, reporting that a devastating symptom 
called self-injurious behavior (SIB), found sometimes in children with 
autism and intellectual disabilities, was catatonic in nature, and that it 
responded readily to such anticatatonic treatments as benzodiazepines and 
convulsive therapy.24 Yet was there further evidence of the catatonic nature 
of SIB? Working with Dr Wachtel, I searched the pediatric literature of the 
past, and found around eight cases of SIB where the clinical course was 
reported in detail. In all of these, other symptoms of catatonia accompanied 
the SIB, providing highly suggestive evidence – in addition to the current-
day data on responsiveness – of the catatonic nature of SIB.25  (This is 
important because, as I pointed out above, catatonia can be readily treated.) 
Our autism research also raised the question, what is autism? A single 
syndrome that can be arrayed on a spectrum of severity called Autism 
Spectrum Disorder? Or a group of distinct illnesses that have been 
somehow lumped together in an autism basin? It was clear to Lee Wachtel 
and myself that some autistic children are also psychotic, others not. Some 
had catatonia, others didn’t. Autism, catatonia and psychosis often occurred 
together. In 2012 Wachtel and I proposed the concept of the ‘iron triangle’, 
a possible subset of autism, involving psychosis and catatonia.26 I provided 
historical examples, she current ones. Is the iron triangle differentially 
responsive to treatment? We don’t know yet. 
The last example of a clinical contribution I shall mention here 
concerns the classification of psychiatric illness, which is called ‘nosology’. 
It is clear on the basis of historical data that the chief international 
classification today, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association, falls wide of the mark in terms of identifying 
distinctive psychiatric disease entities as they exist in nature. The Manual is, 
in other words, full of artifacts. 
                                                     
24 L.E. Wachtel et al., ‘ECT for self-injury in an autistic boy’, European Child & 
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One artifact is the diagnosis of ‘major depression’, which currently 
counts as the chief form of depressive illness. Yet psychiatry historically has 
always recognized at least two distinct forms of depression, melancholia and 
other forms of depressive illness that are not melancholic in nature. In 1996 
Sydney psychiatrist Gordon Parker labeled these ‘melancholia’ and ‘non-
melancholia’.27 In 2006 U.S. psychiatrists Michael Alan Taylor and Max Fink, 
leading figures among international students of psychopathology, further 
positioned melancholia on the radar of the field with a clinicians’ guide to 
its diagnosis and treatment.28 
Because Dr Fink and I had been working together, with David Healy, 
on a history of electroconvulsive therapy, I was up to date on the 
melancholia discussion, and in 2006 Tom Bolwig, professor of psychiatry in 
Copenhagen, and I organized an international conference on melancholia, 
the proceedings of which were published the following year.29 In 2013 my 
own book on the history of depressive illness, which prominently featured 
melancholia, appeared.30 These combined efforts have helped contribute to 
elevating the prominence of melancholia in the eyes of the profession, from 
a ‘specifier’ of major depression to, in the eyes of some, an independent 
illness of its own.  
Another artifact plaguing the current nosology is ‘schizophrenia’, 
artifactual not because chronic psychosis does not exist, but because it 
exists in multiple forms; there is no single, distinct disease called 
‘schizophrenia’, even though the term seems to have a choke-hold upon the 
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The general conclusion is that historians of psychiatry are able to 
contribute to clinical science, once they appreciate which current problems 
may be illuminated with historical understanding. Yet achieving this very 
appreciation may involve additional preparation going beyond the 
traditional history curriculum. The whole trail of knowledge that stretches 
from organic chemistry, across psychopharmacology and psychopathology, 
and into clinical psychiatry, may pass through unfamiliar terrain. Yet the 
journey is worth commencing. 
 
I have said a few words about Matthew Smith of the University of 
Strathclyde and Jaap Bos of the University of Utrecht. Let me introduce 
now the remaining authors in this volume: Sander L Gilman, at Emory 
University, a well-known historian of Freud and psychoanalysis, writes 
about popular stereotypes of mental illness as reflected in the claims that it 
constitutes a form of disability; Dorothy Porter, in the Health Sciences 
Faculty of the University of California San Francisco, discusses how new 
insights into the genetics and biochemistry of Parkinson’s Disease have 
shifted the psychological profile of the patients from the classical turn-of-
the-century ‘Parkinsonian personality’ to a more creative profile. This is in 
line with the discovery that brain diseases may have liberating functions; 
Joost Vijselaar, of the University of Utrecht, engages with the role of the 
passions and imagination in treating the mentally ill in the eighteenth-
century Netherlands, a concept that influenced the development of Dutch 
psychiatry in the nineteenth century; Leo van Bergen looks at the historical 
development of the concept of ‘shell shock’, in the context of writing on 
the larger issue of the neuroses and their classification; Herman Westerink 
analyzes changes in psychiatric understanding of demonic possession. There 
were similarities, especially in the work of Charcot and Freud, in seeing 
possession as a form of hysteria. The article examines differences between 
Charcot and Freud on this important subject. Léjon Saarloos, of Leiden 
University, examines the rise and fall of the career of Dutch psychiatrist 
Gerbrandus Jelgersma, a career that ended in the infamous Papendrechtse 
Strafzaak (Papendrecht trial) of 1907-1910, in which all the witnesses for the 
defense were declared to be insane. The case had unfortunate consequences 
for forensic psychiatry. 
 
